Smith-Madrone & Summit Lake Wineries Join Hoopes Vineyards In Action Alleging Illegal Government Overreach Against Small Businesses
September 8th – NAPA – Two wineries have filed motions to join Hoopes Vineyards as parties in interest in the ongoing action against Napa County alleging an unlawful pattern and practice of forcing wineries that have operated for decades to seek permits for rights they have long possessed. The wineries joining Hoopes Vineyards are Smith-Madrone and Summit Lake.
“At a time when we’re shutting down schools, County taxpayers will spend more than $1 million to pursue a lawsuit that a judge already ruled is likely to fail,” said Lindsay Hoopes, proprietor of Hoopes Vineyards, a law professor and former prosecutor. “We are small wineries that have been operating for more than forty years. The government has gone completely rogue and is attacking lawfully operating small businesses in an illegal effort to seize property rights that we’ve possessed for decades.”
According to court records, Napa County Superior Court Judge Cynthia Smith ruled in November of last year that the County was unlikely to prevail on the merits of its lawsuit against Hoopes Vineyards. In spite of this ruling, the County has pressed on with its illegal action at extraordinary taxpayer expense, alleging that no one is allowed to stay on the property and consume wine in any format at Hoopes Vineyards. The County, however, does not have the authority to prohibit that activity. Hoopes has an O-2 permit which, pursuant to Business and Professions Code Section 23558, allows licensed winegrowers to “sell wine to consumers for consumption on the premises.” Importantly, the law holds that local authorities “may restrict, but not eliminate, [these] privileges.”
“Napa County has long attempted to assert jurisdiction over small wineries even when it’s preempted by state law,” said Stu Smith, Founder and General Partner at Smith-Madrone Vineyards. “50 years ago the County tried to regulate activity at my vineyard operation that was governed by state law and the California Supreme Court ruled against them. We joined this lawsuit because it’s a half-century later and the County still hasn’t learned its lesson.”
In Napa County, wineries that sought permits after 1990 had to go through a discretionary conditional use permit process in which those operators may agree to some restrictions that could limit their ability to sell wine or offer tastings and tours, such as limitations on hours of operation or number of visitors. However, small wineries like Hoopes, Smith-Madrone and Summit Lake that were in existence before the Winery Definition Ordinance of 1990 were grandfathered in as an “integral part of the Napa Valley economy.” Napa County Code sections 18.16.020(H), 18.104.040 and 18.08.040 explicitly allow wineries with small winery use permits and exemptions in existence prior to 1990 (like Hoopes, Smith-Madrone and Summit Lake) to operate as wineries, including marketing, sales, and any related winery accessory uses, under their existing entitlements.
“We’re joining this lawsuit because we have hit a dead end and have no other viable options,” said Heather Griffin, a Partner at Summit Lake Vineyards. “We just want to do what we’ve been doing for forty years, which is allow customers to drink our wine in the environment in which it was made. Tastings are allowed at wineries across the Valley and yet the County is trying to stop this activity at long standing smaller operations like Summit Lake. They are putting an undue burden on the small family owned and operated wineries that the Napa Valley was built on, and it’s killing us off one by one.”
The County filed an action against Hoopes Vineyards in October, 2020, and Hoopes subsequently filed a cross-complaint. Prior to the dispute, in 2019, then Planning, Building, and Environmental Services (PBES) Director, David Morrison, confirmed that Ms. Hoopes could lawfully sell wine at Hoopes Vineyards. All County officials have expressly stated that Hoopes has unlimited rights to “retail wine sales” which, pursuant to state law, cannot legally or reasonably be divorced from the right to consume that wine. Nonetheless, beginning in 2020, Hoopes Vineyards began receiving notices of apparent violation–but not actual citations–from Napa County Code Enforcement. These notices demanded compliance with rules that do not exist, took issue with activity that did not occur, were speculative, and demanded Hoopes cease activities expressly allowed – like “marketing” and “sales” – under lawfully vested rights.
For example, the notices of apparent violation included incomprehensible allegations such as Hoopes’ use of string lights on the property. Code Enforcement Officer Kelli Cahill testified that she could not recall where or why string lights were prohibited (p. 68). The code referenced in the notice of violation did not relate to the Agricultural Preserve (AP), but rather a different zoning district (p. 90-91.) Indeed, the winery across the street from Hoopes has string lights, too. Pictures cited as evidence in the County’s lawsuit of apparent violations were taken at other properties.
The notices indicated that Airstreams were not allowed on the property and must be put in “storage.” In her deposition, however, Ms. Cahill noted that an Airstream was “okay” and there was no statute that prohibited RVs from being parked in the AP (p. 63, 96). Ms. Cahill went on to say, however, that because 6204 Washington Street was commercial property, it would not be a code violation, but code enforcement would want to come to some sort of agreement to remove it from the property, anyway (pp. 63-64). Ms. Cahill also admitted in her deposition that some of the allegations were speculative.
Hoopes also received a notice of apparent violation for an animal sanctuary on the premises even though Code Enforcement Officer Cahill conceded in a sworn deposition that animals are allowed in the Agricultural Preserve and at the property (p. 69, 79, 96). Ms. Cahill noted that animals “are allowed in the AP zoning district, they are not allowed as — to be used in conjunction with a winery.” Ms. Cahill said the prohibition “might be [found] under the Winery Definition Ordinance” but didn’t know for sure.
Hoopes Vineyards also received a notice of apparent violation for chicken coops that were larger than 120 square feet despite Ms. Cahill testifying in her deposition that no one from the County ever measured the animal sheds on the property, or confirmed that the sheds were larger than 120 square feet before issuing the notices of apparent violation or bringing the lawsuit (pp. 65, 75-76, 78, 96). Ironically, as the County’s legal costs push closer to seven figures, Cahill stated in her deposition that the reason she did not visit the winery was because, “We don’t have funding” (p. 35).
Arthur Hartinger, who serves as outside counsel for the County, said in a recent CBS piece, “A use permit exemption does not allow for tours, tastings, or consuming wine on the premises.” However, the Napa County Winery Database, produced and published by the County, indicates otherwise. Furthermore, this same attorney told a judge (p. 23), “in the small winery, permits were granted at that time. The uses in place at the time were grandfathered in.” Code Enforcement Officers Kelli Cahill and David Giudice similarly acknowledged in their deposition that some small wineries, including exemptions, could host tours and tastings (Cah. Dep. at p. 10).
“I’m a former prosecutor and this is the most egregious government overreach and abuse of discretion I have ever seen,” Ms. Hoopes added. “The laws are ‘know it when you see it, and make them up as you go.’ If you do not agree, or ask questions, the County just sues without a hearing or reasonable opportunity to dispute the claims. It is impossible to operate a business when the goalposts keep moving. This is an enormous problem, but everyone is too afraid to come forward. It has to stop, and I’m grateful to these other small wineries for having the courage to stand with me.”
The case is Napa County v. Hoopes Family Winery, LLC, et al, Case No. 22CV001262.
